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The End of Britain?: 





The aim of this paper is to examine the future of Britain and Britishness considering simultaneous 
challenges from immigration, devolution, and further integration into the EU. These three challenges 
are discussed from six different perspectives, namely Welsh and Scottish nationalism, English 
nationalism, Conservative and Labour’s British nationalism, and that of ethnic minorities. I explore 
whether Britishness has been shared or denied and reinforced or weakened among these different 
groups. I also explore how these groups justify their position on devolution, European integration, and 
multiculturalism. This essay eventually focuses on New Labour’s rationales to reshape Britain and 
reinforce Britishness in terms of a multilevel governance entity, and a combination of pride and 
interest.  
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1. BRITISHNESS IN CONTRA FLOWS 
 
Britain, formerly an Empire and now a European nation-state, faces simultaneous 
challenges from immigration, devolution, and further integration into the EU. Immigration 
from the New Commonwealth has caused worries about erosion of cultural homogeneity; 
devolution has precipitated a possible situation of the break-up of Britain; and European 




The aim of this essay is to examine the future of Britain and Britishness considering these 
three challenges. These challenges are discussed from six different perspectives, namely 
Welsh and Scottish nationalism, English nationalism, Conservative and Labour’s British 
nationalism, and that of ethnic minorities. I explore whether Britishness has been shared or 
                                                          
1 Britain has national minorities — the Welsh, the Scots, and the Irish in Northern Ireland — and ethnic 
minorities — Caribbean Africans and South Asians, whose origin has colored immigration from the 
New Commonwealth. The British Empire distinguished between the Old Commonwealth, which 
included Australia, New Zealand, and Canada and the New Commonwealth that consisted of South 
Asian and Caribbean countries. According to the 2001 national census, Britain has 4.6 million or 7.9 
percent ethnic minorities (including 660,000 of mixed ethnic groups) out of a total population of about 
58.8 million. The population of each nation is about 49 million in England, 5 million in Scotland, 2.9 
million in Wales, and 1.7 million in Northern Ireland. National and ethnic minorities have different 
characteristics. National minorities typically have been incorporated into the larger state by conquest, 
colonization or treaty, involuntarily in many cases, and they frequently wish to maintain their status as 
a distinct society within the larger state. Ethnic groups, by contrast, have their source in the voluntary 
immigration of people from one state to another, and the individual members of ethnic groups wish to 
integrate into the majority society, even though they want to preserve their cultural tradition of origin 
(Kymlicka 1995). 
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denied and reinforced or weakened among these different groups. I also explore how these 
groups justify their position on devolution, European integration, and multiculturalism.  
This essay eventually focuses on Labour’s British nationalism, that is, New Labour’s 
rationales to reshape Britain and reinforce Britishness. I analyze New Labour’s project in 
terms of a multilevel governance entity that has a different power of self-government 
according to regions (Marks and Hooghe 2001). I also address a possibility of the project’s 
success focusing on its characteristics of a normative vision and a kind of game plan as well.
2 
 
Scholars have argued about the future of Britain and Britishness. One group emphasizes 
the formal characteristic of Britishness, which has no substance and is seen as soon 
disappearing in the face of devolution and European integration (Colley 2000; Nairn 2000; 
Marquand 2000). In this view, when the legacy of the British Empire has been dissolved and 
European others have disappeared, Britain has no meaning. Britain is simply demoted to a 
mere administrative structure that is bloodless, historyless, and affectless (Marquand 1997; 
2000).  
The other perspective stresses the positive contribution of Britain to the development of 
democracy and expects the nation’s core values to continue after adjusting themselves to 
various challenges (Canovan 1996; Dewar 1998; Aughey 2001). According to this view, 
Britain has developed a community of interest, or democratic solidarity, since 1707. 
Whatever the old logic to the union was, there is now a new commonality that we can call a 
collective identity (Canovan 1996). For example, the National Health Service, economic 
linkages, and national security concerns have taken their place as common interests among 
the four nations (Dewar 1998: 18-19).  
What then is the nature of Britain and Britishness? How has it been formed and 
challenged in modern and contemporary history? We can trace at least three historical 
characteristics regardless of position. First of all, Britain was an invention historically 
constructed after contingency of the 1707 arrangement. It was not based on cultural and 
ethnic homogeneity, but based on political construction (Colley 2000).
3
  
From the early eighteenth century, Britain has been the common name to call together 
nations of England, Scotland, Wales, and later Ireland. The spread of protestant belief, many 
wars against European others, and the pride of the British Empire had been the major 
impetus to promote sharing Britishness. The construction of British identity had been 
                                                          
2 This essay is basically a narrative, not about what people actually believe, but about what popular 
periodicals, famous scholars, and politicians claim they believe. I analyze various discourses of 
politicians and scholars, which have appeared in newspapers, journals, and books. My approach to 
exploring political ideas can be justified on two grounds. First, a mode of existence of identity is 
highly derivative in the middle of public discourses. Accordingly, tracing such discourses can provide 
a perspective of the existing political and social identity. Second, ideas and political arguments of 
leading figures tend to work as an institutional structure that shape people’s action and influence their 
perception. These two grounds are drawn from the role of idea and leadership, which is common in a 
new institutional approach (Hall and Taylor 1996; 1998; Hay and Wincott 1998).  
3 The official name of this state, commonly called Britain, is ‘The United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland’, which consists of four nations: England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. 
England incorporated Wales by two Acts of Parliament in 1536 and 1543. Scotland was made part of 
the Kingdom by merging its parliament with English parliament in 1707. Through the Act of Union in 
1800, Ireland was also made part of the Kingdom. In 1921, Ireland achieved independence and 
Northern Ireland remained as a part of the Kingdom.  




completed in the nineteenth century and culminated in the World War I (Park 1997: 19-45). 
However, there has always been tension and conflicts among the four nations, especially 
over the dominance of England. While some of them have nicely adjusted themselves into 
being British, or the multiple identities of British and one’s nationality of origin, others have 
denied to be British choosing the exclusive identity of one’s original nation.  
For example, according to the General Household Survey by the Office for National 
Statistics in 2001, which included national identity questions for the first time, 31 percent of 
the UK people regarded themselves exclusively as British, 15 percent regarded themselves as 
British and one of English, Scottish, Welsh, and Irish at the same time, and 49 percent as 
only one of English, Scottish, Welsh, and Irish. So, just 46 percent of the people, including 
those who have multiple identities, share a British identity. This ratio is lowered in Scotland 
where only 27 percent say that they are British or British and Scottish, while 80 percent say 
that they are Scottish. In Wales 35 percent choose British, and 62 percent Welsh. In England 
48 percent choose British, and 57 percent English (The Office for National Statistics 2002). 
These figures illustrate that there is a salient difference in people’s mind according to regions, 
which would be source to justify the desire of each nation for self-government away from 
Britain. 
Second, as such, Britain was not a unitary state even though it was the result of a political 
compromise. With relatively low threats of invasion compared to other European countries 
and the strong veto powers of the Commons since the seventeenth century, the British 
monarchy did not develop any sort of the stable unit of a state apparatus like in France 
(Dyson 1980: 36-43). According to Nettl, the only common usage of the word ‘state’ in 
British history was in connection with the concept of the welfare state. But even in the 
economic sense of its usage, it did not replace the more deeply anchored cultural 
statelessness of British politics and society as a whole. The absence of autonomous areas of 
state activity could make for relatively rich debates with respect to self-government of the 
locals and the four nations as well (Nettl 1968: 583).
4
  
However, the accidental aspect of Britishness was complemented by the extension of 
common rights of citizenship, which are based on reciprocal rights and duties, reforms 
without revolution, a sense of public service, and the notion of the nation as an ethical 
institution (Scot 1990: 193-94; Aughey 2001: 36). According to Aughey, while the identity 
of the four nations was mainly defined by the ethnic and cultural commonality, Britishness 
went with the expansion of this common citizenship. The political characteristics of 
Britishness provided a good environment in which people accepted multiple identities more 
easily. In this sense, the liberal legacy of the British Empire that fostered individual freedom, 
the rule of law, and tolerance of difference was the reason for being British over English, 
Scot, or Welsh.  
Nevertheless, difference in the interest of Wales and Scotland has been widened from that 
of England and furthermore, that of Britain as a whole, especially with respect to the recent 
agenda of European integration. The nationalists in Scotland and Wales have demanded a 
more radical form of self-government and regarded the EU as a positive environment for 
their desire toward the diffusion of territorial power. By contrast, a majority of English, 
under the name of British, have ardently campaigned against European integration with the 
concern for protecting British tradition of parliamentary sovereignty. But, because of the 
                                                          
4  In this context, Nettl regarded the problem of functional equivalence in the following terms: 
continental Europe — state; Britain — political party; the United States — law (Nettl 1968: 577).   
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sheer size of England, the negative position of England under a voice of Britain has 
overridden the interests of Scotland and Wales. Even in the current situation as a member of 
the EU, Britain has always tried to limit the EU’s development as an intergovernmental 
network, out of two competing trends in the development of the EU, that is, sovereignty- 
sharing supranationalism and sovereignty-preserving intergovenmentalism.  
Third, Britishness is also rooted in the notion of the authority of the Crown, in which the 
nation was founded on the patriotic allegiance of the people to the monarch. With that 
allegiance, all subjects were included as members of the nation irrespective of their regional, 
cultural or national differences. This monarchic tradition was often mentioned as reason that 
Britain lacked an idea of the people that was a critical component of coherent nationalism. 
According to Nairn, this situation was supplemented by supposing an enemy in and outside 
of the nation (Nairn 1981: 294-95; 2000). Historically, that enemy was sometimes France in 
Colley’s interpretation, and sometimes the British black minority in Nairn’s view. However, 
Britain has now lost its one significant other as European integration has furthered. In this 
situation the role of ethnic minorities as the only remaining other becomes more important. 
The challenge of multiculturalism is, therefore, quite ambivalent in the sense that it can be 
mobilized to function as both threat and chance to reinforcing Britishness. 
Interestingly, the meaning of devolution and European integration is quite different to 
national and ethnic minorities. While devolution means a realization of self-government to 
national minorities, for ethnic minorities it could mean being excluded from more narrowly 
defined ethnic categories. Ethnic minorities cannot easily become a Scot, Welsh, and English. 
Therefore, with the rising of regional nationalism, they would lose a haven that a 
multinational Britain has provided. The same would be true for the European integration case. 
While European integration means a possible detour toward the EU skipping the British state 
to national minorities, for ethnic minorities it could mean an erosion of British identity upon 
which they have traditionally relied.  
As such, three levels of challenges have different implication for each of the six related 
parties. The destiny of Britain and Britishness have been complicated in this matrix of 
concurrent challenges from devolution, European integration, and multiculturalism. Let us 
now examine the changing connotation of Britain and Britishness from the viewpoint of five 
kinds of nationalism and of ethnic minorities. 
 
 
2. WELSH CULTURAL NATIONALISM 
 
The first real attempts at devolution, or home rule in Britain, were the Liberal leader 
Gladstone’s Irish Bills of 1886 and 1893, which were both defeated. The third bill, 
introduced in 1912, became law in 1914. However, with the outbreak of war the Act was 
suspended and, in fact, it never came into effect (Bogdanor 1999a). The devolution agenda 
again returned in 1968 when the Labour government appointed a Royal Commission on the 
Constitution.  
In 1974 the Labour government eventually succeeded in legislating for both Scotland and 
Wales, and referendums were held on March 1, 1979. Wales rejected devolution with the 
results of Yes, 20.2 percent and No, 79.8 percent, out of the 58.8 percent turnout. The Scots 
endorsed it with the results of Yes, 51.6 percent and No, 48.5 percent out of the 62.9 percent 
turnout. However, the Scots did not achieve devolution because of the number regulation 
which required 40 percent approval out of total entitled voters. According to that regulation, 




the Yes vote was 32.85 percent of the possible electorate (Bogdanor 1999a: 190). Following 
the successful referendum in 1997, Scotland and Wales finally achieved devolution in 1999. 
Why then did the people of Wales reject devolution in 1979? To answer this question one 
should mention the limit of Welsh nationalism. The main characteristics of Welsh 
nationalism have been culturist, a movement of language preservation and cultural defense 
(Nairn 1981). Interestingly, though, only 19 percent of the people in Wales now speak Welsh. 
This narrow base of Welsh cultural nationalism means that it lacks a persuasive idea of the 
people. Of course, there is no need that Welshness should entail a political sense of 
nationhood in every occasion. But only a 20.2 percent approval in the 1979 devolution 
referendum seems to confirm the weakness of this political Welshness.  
 Judging from the low approval rate in the 1997 referendum which recorded a 50.3 
percent vote out of the 51.3 percent turnout, one can argue that a realistic view is still 
dominant in Wales (Aughey 2001: 116). People in Wales acknowledge the political limit of 
cultural Welshness and pragmatic advantage of Britishness, which is offered when they 
choose to stay under the umbrella of Britain. Accordingly, the choice of Welsh people in the 
1997 referandum was not a Parliament with tax-varying powers, but an Assembly without a 
taxation right. In other words, the Government of Wales Act provides, not legislative 
devolution, but executive devolution, the devolution of secondary legislation and other 
executive powers.  
In this regard, the relevant question for devolution in Wales has often been who is the 
‘self’ in self-government. The existence of citizens who have enough solidarity to sustain a 
polity and their voluntary participation in public activities are the fundamental conditions to 
constitute an autonomous political community. Adrian Kay and others, therefore, pay 
attention to the role of Welsh Assembly in fostering a separate Welsh political identity to 
replace the existing fragile polity in terms of the normative value of autonomy (Rawlings 
1998: 461-509; Kay 2003: 51-66). 
In the May 1999 Welsh Assembly election, Plaid Cymru, the Welsh nationalist party, won 
17 seats on 29.5 percent of the vote, which made it the second largest party next to the 
Labour, which won 28 seats on 36.5 percent of the vote. Out of a total of 60 seats that 
consisted of 40 from constituencies and 20 from party lists, the Conservative won 9 seats on 
16.2 percent vote and the Liberal Democrats claimed 6 seats on 13 percent of the vote. Plaid 
Cymru, which has asserted full self-government, had slowly, but steadily expanded its base. 
It gained 7.8 percent in the 1983 general election, 7.3 percent in 1987, 8.8 percent in 1992, 
9.9 percent in 1997, and 14.3 percent in 2001,  
Jonathan Bradbury argues that one of the reasons for this expansion resulted from the 
Thatcherite program of privatization. Plaid Cymru has based its policies on socialist 
principles since its inception in 1925. However, the Thatcherite project shifted the focus of 
Welsh politics from an old socialist economy to a need for inward investment. During the 
New Right’s privatization, the urgent task for Wales was to sell itself as an attractive nation 
within the EU. This process encouraged Wales to estimate devolution positively. In this 
sense, Thatcher would be said as the midwife of devolution (Bradbury 1998: 130-133).  
Regarding the multi-level relations among Wales, Britain, and the EU, Eurig Wyn, a 
Member of the European Parliament of Plaid Cymru, shows well a Welsh nationalist’s 
position. According to him, “The rights of the stateless nations of Europe — like Wales and 
Scotland — will be better represented in the European Union than through the British state. 
The regional disparity in Britain, measured through unemployment and low wages, is now 
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the worst in Europe, and is not being addressed properly by the British state. The European 
Union has a far better regional policy” (NewsWales 4/2/2002). 
Although a majority of Welsh people acknowledge a pragmatic advantage of Britishness, 
Welsh nationalists deny the positive role of the British state. They want their own nationality 
and greater integration into the EU. Under a federal EU, they believe a safer space for their 
national self-government can be guaranteed.  
 
 
3. SCOTTISH “PHILISTINE” NATIONALISM 
 
Scottish nationalism differs from that of Wales in several aspects. As Tom Nairn said, if 
Welsh nationalism was culturist, then Scottish nationalism tended to be philistine (Nairn 
1981: 197). Its characteristic was more politically oriented, though it was not necessarily 
politicized. The Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP), which was founded in 1934 and declared 
its aim to create an independent state in the mainstream of Europe, was stronger in its 
electoral gains than the Plaid Cymru in Wales. For example, the SNP won 11.8 percent of the 
support in the 1983 general election, 14.0 percent in 1987, 21.5 percent in 1992, 22.1 percent 
in 1997, and 20.06 percent in 2001. 
As evidence of a higher level of political orientation in Scottish nationalism, one can 
point out that Scotland had the convention to deal with devolution matters. It is very 
important in terms of a democratic process to collect the voluntary agreement among the 
people as citizens of an (would-be) autonomous polity through such a convention. The 
Scottish Constitutional Convention was established in March 1989, following the 
recommendation of A Claim of Right for Scotland, the report that the Campaign for a 
Scottish Assembly published in July 1988.  
For the Labour Party, the Convention was the useful vehicle to absorb Scottish discontent 
with Westminster politics and to develop proposals for devolution. Tony Blair acknowledges 
that “the Scottish Constitutional Convention process has helped produce cross-party 
consensus about the case for change” (Blair 1996: 272). However, the SNP withdrew from 
the convention because it would not recommend independence and the Scottish 
Conservatives refused to join the convention because they believed that the convention 
already shared an independence mindset (Aughey 2001: 140).  
In the 1997 referendum, the result was 74.3 percent to 25.7 percent in favor of a Scottish 
Parliament, and 63.5 percent to 36.0 percent in favor of tax-varying power (Bogdanor 1999a: 
199). The Scottish Parliament was granted to levy taxes by varying income tax by up to three 
pence in the pound. Excluding five areas in which power was reserved to Westminster, such 
as macro-economic policy, social security, foreign affairs, defense and constitutional matters, 
all other matters were devolved to the Scottish Parliament. The results of the 1999 election 
for the Scottish Parliament were Labour 56, SNP 35, Conservative 18, Liberal Democrat 17, 
and three independents out of a total of 129 seats. 
One of the common denominators in Scottish nationalism is said to be an anti-English 
sentiment. With respect to the motive of anti-English sentiment, Jack Brand argued that the 
enemy of Scottish nationalists was not the English people but those British institutions that 
could have been portrayed as part of the English establishment (Brand 1978; 1987). This 
argument can be explained from the SNP’s unusual stance as a nationalist party. Like the 
Plaid Cymru, the SNP has supported social democratic policy. For them, the libertarian 
approach of the New Right was regarded as the typical English way. So, in the SNP’s view, 




Thatcherite revolution could mean that the English libertarian way attempted to dissolve 
Scottish social democratic traditions. In fact, Thatcher criticized Scottish socialist tradition 
and described Scotland as the only place where her libertarian revolution did not work 
(Thatcher 1993: 618-19). These ideological differences were behind the hostility of Scotland 
against England. 
Scottish and Welsh nationalists believe that their national self-government can be better 
guaranteed in the mainstream of Europe. European integration is certainly a good 
environment to encourage their claim for self-government. For example, according to a 
January 2002 poll, Wales was the first nation to back single euro currency membership. The 
poll showed that 41 percent of Welsh respondents said they would vote ‘Yes’ to joining the 
Euro, 40 percent would vote ‘No’, 4 percent would abstain and 15 percent ‘Don’t Know’. 
When the don’t knows are excluded, the majority edges to 51 to 49 percent in favor of the 
Euro. Polling in Scotland also showed a softening of opposition with a 5 percent gap — 37 
percent ‘Yes’ to 42 percent ‘No’ (The Guardian 1/15/2002). Another poll in June 2004 
suggested that support for the proposed EU constitutional treaty is higher in Scotland than in 
the rest of Britain. The ‘Yes’ in Scotland is 38 percent over ‘No’ of 35 percent. The overall 
British figures are 31 percent ‘Yes’ to 45 percent ‘No’ in this poll.
5
  
The differences in regional approval rates, especially England’s low support for joining 
the euro, may bring serious conflicts among the four nations if this difference remains until 
the referendum that is likely to be held in the near future. Timothy Garton Ash points out this 
problem. In Ash’s view, it is Europe and federalism that could be the only way to save 
Britain. He argues that “British opposition to Europe is largely English opposition to Europe. 
Attitudes toward Europe in Scotland and Wales are much more positive. A Conservative 
opposition that continued on its anti-European course could end up destroying the very thing 
it claimed to defend: the United Kingdom (Garton 2001). This salient difference between 
Scottish nationalists and Conservative British nationalists in their positions toward Europe 
and devolution resulted in no Conservative’s seat in Scotland in the 1997 general election 
and only one seat in the 2001 general election. Both in Scotland and Wales, the nationalist 
movement is getting wider support even though there are still some differences in approach 
between the radical group which wants immediate independence and the moderate group 
which insists independence without too much cost.  
 
 
4. LABOUR’S BRITISH NATIONALISM AND ASYMMETRICAL DEVOLUTION 
 
What then is the rationale of New Labour for the devolution policy? What is the position 
of Labour’s British Nationalists on Europe? New Labour certainly wants to keep Britain. 
Labour politics traditionally desired Britain to be differentiated by income and class, and not 
by geography. In the Consensus politics era, Labour promoted national solidarity through 
redistributive taxation, full employment, and welfare provisions. It believed that cleavages 
due to income and class could be healed by these policies, thus national solidarity would be 
maintained.  
The solidarity fostered by the welfare policies had rendered the claims of self-
government unproblematic as long as there was economic growth. But, as Anthony Giddens 
                                                          
5 An NOP poll commissioned by ‘Britain in Europe,’ the pro-European campaign organization in the 
UK, in June 17, 2004. http://www.britainineurope.org.uk. 
NAM-KOOK KIM  68 
  
points out, two presuppositions for the Keynesian Consensus era, state control of national 
economy and state protection of the underprivileged, have faced a radical challenge with the 
emergence of global economic circumstance (Giddens 1994: 74). Britain cannot keep those 
practices of the Consensus era. Therefore, New Labour now suggests not old rhetoric of class 
solidarity, but social solidarity of citizenship in one nation, which is described as a 
multicultural, multiethnic, and multinational citizenship.  
In fact, from the pragmatic viewpoint, the aim of New Labour’s devolution policy is to 
remove the ground of Scottish and Welsh separatists, thus maintaining a unified Britain. But 
it also has a normative vision. According to Gordon Brown, Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
devolution makes citizens share the decision making, through which individuals recognize 
social obligation of citizenship for their community (Brown 2000: 21-23). Blair also 
emphasizes that the imperative for devolution is new common citizenship since the 
individual empowerment can be found in the participatory democracy that devolved 
institutions foster (Blair 1998: 15).  
In addition, Blair argues that devolution is neither some quasi-nationalist form of 
government, nor a watered down form of separatism, or a form of federalism. He 
distinguishes New Labour’s devolution policy from a possible development of the federal 
Britain. While one may suggest the form of a federation in which the English parliament is 
allowed as well as one each for Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, the problem of 
asymmetry would not be resolved by such federation because “England has four-fifths of the 
population and the sense of national and regional identity and the desire for autonomy varies 
greatly” (Blair 1996: 270).   
The Royal Commission on the Constitution in 1973 already warned of this symmetrical 
federalism. According to the Commission, such federation would be dominated by the 
overwhelming political importance and wealth of England. The English parliament would 
rival the United Kingdom’s federal parliament. Accordingly, it would be unworkable and an 
unrealistic option (Bogdanor 1999b: 185-194). In this context, for New Labour, federalism 
may appeal to some, but it is not what New Labour proposes. New Labour’s policy is 
asymmetrical devolution, in which Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland have their own 
parliament, but England does not.  
How then can this unfair situation to England due to the New Labour’s devolution policy 
be fixed? What is New Labour’s solution to this problem? New Labour argues that if 
devolution in England is to serve the same ends as devolution in Scotland and Wales, it must 
be devolution to the English regions, not to an English parliament. So, New Labour 
introduced a directly elected mayor and a regional development agency. It did have a London 
mayoral election in 2000; independent Ken Livingston was elected as mayor.  
New Labour also published a white paper, Your Region, Your Choice: Revitalizing 
English Regions in May 2002, in which eight regional assemblies of England can eventually 
be established instead of regional development agency. In May 2003, the Devolution Bill for 
England was given final royal assent, thereby the government can call for a referendum when 
each region wants to have its own assembly.
6
 After all, New Labour tries to solve the 
complicated needs of devolution, especially that of England, through reshaping Britain as a 
multilevel governance entity that has different powers of self-government according to 
regions. 
                                                          
6 Deputy Prime Minister and the Secretary for the Transport, Local Government and Regions, 2002, 
Your Region, Your Choice: Revitalizing English Regions, London: HMSO. 




What then is the relationship between Labour’s devolution policy and its stance on 
European integration? In the 1950s, Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell opposed the European 
Common market because of his passionate sense of obligation to the Commonwealth. The 
left at the time had an instinctive dislike of what was felt to be a part of a continental cartel 
of capitalists. The Treaty of Rome in 1957 was argued to be incompatible with Labour’s 
ambitions for more nationalization and planning (Mandelson and Liddle 1996: 25-6). 
However, New Labour now argues that the only way that Britain can regain true 
sovereignty is its committed participation in the European Union. Because, for them, 
sovereignty means, not merely the ability of a single country to say no, but the power to 
maximize national strength and capacity in trade, foreign policy, and defense. Sovereignty 
also means the political ability to tackle problems in the public interests, which have slipped 
beyond the nation state, such as global warming, international economic cooperation, and the 
prevention of future wars in Europe (Mandelson and Liddle 1996: 27).  
Robin Cook, Foreign Secretary from 1997 to 2001, argues that Britishness is being 
strengthened by devolution and membership in the EU.
7
 Blair also assessed in his 2001 
speech that the history of Britain’s engagement with Europe is one of the opportunities 
missed in the name of illusions and Britain is suffering as a result.
8
 Accordingly, in Blair’s 
view, the greatest disservice any British leader could do to the British people today is to seek 
to perpetuate those illusions.  
In this context, Blair argues that joining the EU does not bring the loss of British national 
sovereignty. He says, “When Britain isolated itself in the past, we squandered our 
sovereignty — leaving us sole masters of a shrinking sphere of influence.” Therefore, “it is 
time for us to adjust to the fact (Blair 2001).” More importantly, Europe is in Britain’s 
economic interest. Nearly 60 per cent of British trade is with the rest of Europe. Accordingly, 
Blair concludes “Britain has no economic future outside Europe (Blair 2001).”  
New Labour has re-evaluated Britain’s old policy on European integration and argued for 
the need of new approach. Labour’s British nationalism has always remained faithful to 
Britain. But, with a shift of power from the Old Left to New Labour, its strategy has also 
changed from old rhetoric of class solidarity to social solidarity of common citizenship, from 
the intentional ignorance of geography to asymmetrical devolution, and from a dislike of 
continental capitalist cartels to active participation in European integration.  
As a result, New Labour’s efforts have provided a new environment for both ethnic and 
national minorities. Its asymmetrical devolution removed the ground of extreme separatists 
without the break-up of Britain and gave a different level of self-government to national 
minorities. The possible disadvantageous situation for ethnic minorities due to devolution 
has been countered by locating Britain as a center of multi-level governance and reinforcing 
Britishness as a central value of that entity. In principle, ethnic minorities can choose to be 




                                                          
7 Cook emphasized that “Britain is a European country in its geography and history. All Britain has to 
lose is the timidity which prevents Britain from embracing our European destiny and from 
recognizing that it is a source of confidence in our nation’s future.”(Cook 2001)  
8 Blair(2001) argued “We said that it wouldn’t happen. Then we said it wouldn’t work. Then we said 
we did not need it. But it did happen. And Britain was left behind.”  
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5. CONSERVATIVE BRITISH NATIONALISM AND PARLIAMENTARY 
SOVEREIGNTY 
 
What then is the position of Conservative British nationalists on devolution, European 
integration, and multiculturalism? When one refers to the Conservative ‘one nation’, it has 
two dimensions. One is to sustain class harmony uniting the rich and the poor, the other is to 
maintain the territorial union of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. In all 
fairness, one nation, since the nineteenth century Conservative Prime Minster Disraeli’s 
usage, was at the core of Conservative thinking; unifying the two dimensions was the 
ultimate identity that Conservative British nationalists pursued. 
A Conservative Britain is also defined by the four core values: parliamentary sovereignty, 
individualist society, homogeneous culture, and an independent island without commitment 
toward Europe (Parekh 2000a: 9-12). Accordingly, Conservative British nationalists reject 
both devolution and EU integration. For them, devolution of power to Scotland and Wales 
means to give power to anti-parliamentary groups, which could eventually destroy the unity 
and identity of Britain. A further integration into the EU is also evaluated as giving up the 
principle of parliamentary sovereignty.  
Parliamentary sovereignty means that Parliament has the unlimited legislative authority, 
thus no person, even the courts, has a right to override the decision of Parliament 
(Goldsworthy 1999: 9-21). To illustrate, Parliament was the highest court in the land and the 
authority of last resort from which no appeal was possible. All subjects were represented in 
Parliament and its decision reflected the collective wisdom of the entire community, which 
was superior to that of any other agency in the state. People were, therefore, deemed to 
consent to Parliament’s acts and to be forbidden from disputing them (Goldsworthy 1999: 
234).  
In Conservative traditions, as Thatcher vigorously campaigned, sovereign individuals 
under sovereign parliament were ideal. There would be no exceptions, only equality of 
citizenship and freedom of opportunity throughout the whole of the United Kingdom. 
Therefore, if one tries to define British citizens as members of minority groups, for 
Conservatives, this would mean to deny their truth as sovereign individuals.  
There is a real temptation for the Conservative Party to exploit the grievance of England 
by playing the English card since New Labour’s devolution policy has been unfair to 
England. However, the Conservative Party has not yet fully succumbed to that temptation 
despite its main electoral base being in England. A majority of Conservative MPs, including 
its leaders Thatcher and Hague, have never supported English nationalism in their public 
appearances. They always talk about keeping Britain and Britishness. This stance reflects 
their dilemma in which they should appeal to England without alienating Scotland and Wales. 
For example, on Scotland’s hostility against England, Thatcher asserted that the Tory 
party was not an English party, but a Unionist one. If it sometimes seemed English to some 
Scots, said Thatcher, that was because the Union was inevitably dominated by England by 
reason of its greater population. Thatcher conceded that, as nations, Scotland and Wales have 
an undoubted right to national self-determination. But, it only had to be exercised by joining 
and remaining in the Union. For Thatcher, to demand devolution as a right of nationhood 
inside the Union was absurd (Thatcher 1993: 624).  
William Hague, a Conservative Leader from 1997 to 2001, also lines up with this kind of 
Conservative tradition. Hague argues that the identity of Britain is to be found in institutions 




rather than in ethnicity.
9
 In the 2001 general election, he called on Eurosceptics outside of 
the Tory party to back the Conservatives at the election so that they could preserve an 
independent Britain and allow British people to remain sovereign in their own country. 
Hague also placed asylum and Europe at the heart of a campaign by evoking fears that four 
more years of Labour government would turn Britain into a foreign land. If so, Hague argues, 
British people feel like strangers in their own country, where control of the economy was 
given away to Brussels.
10
  
Hague’s arguments are basically a pledge to preserve Britain and Britishness. But, how 
do all these words resonate to the Scots and Welsh people? It is probably not easy for them 
to distinguish the voice of British nationalists from that of English nationalists.  
Kenneth Clark, former Conservative Chancellor under Major, pointed out that the 
Conservative Party would never form a truly national government unless it abandoned its 
English nationalism. “We did behave as an English party at the 2001 election, thus failed to 
win any seats in Wales and just one seat in Scotland” (The Guardian 7/4/2001) In fact, here 
is the Conservative’s dilemma. It cannot ignore its main electoral gains from England as well 
as its commitment toward Britain. But, as far as it seems to favor England, it would face 
hostility from Scotland and Wales.     
 
 
6. ENGLISH NATIONALISM AND A QUESTION OF SYMMETRY 
 
The position of English nationalists is different from that of the Conservative majority 
and its leaders who want to cherish Britishness. It shows a more extreme view. With the rise 
of Scottish and Welsh nationalism, New Labour’s devolution policy has also offered a better 
climate for English nationalists in which they can publicly argue for the break-up of Britain 
in support of their own English parliament. The reason for supporting devolution for English 
nationalists is quite different from that of Scottish and Welsh nationalists. They regard 
Scotland and Wales as mere sources of trouble and subsidy-draining peripheries (Gamble 
2000: 2). So, they want to break up Britain without any further commitment to Scotland and 
Wales and to have their own parliament.  
In January 1998, the Eurosceptic Conservative backbencher Teresa Gorman moved a 
private member’s bill calling for a referendum on an English parliament. But this position 
has been unacceptable for the Conservative leaders as well as for New Labour’s plan of 
keeping Britain.  
English nationalists also show an anti-multicultural stance. They are worried about 
increasing number of ethnic minorities who are assumed to undermine a homogeneous 
Anglo-Saxon society. In the 2001 general election, the three Tory MPs, James Cran, Eric 
                                                          
9 Hague said “Britishness must be patriotism without bigotry. Parliamentary sovereignty is to stay at 
the core value of British identity. Individualism remained one of them, but so too was loyalty to the 
institutions of civil society.” (Hague 1999). 
10 The Guardian, March 6, 2001. Hague declared, “It is time to bring it back, it is time to bring Britain 
home. Above all, the people of Britain believe in their country. They are not narrow nationalists. They 
are not xenophobes. But they take pride in what our country has achieved.” In Hague’s view, New 
Labour rather derided Britishness. “Talk about Europe and they call you extreme. Talk about asylum 
and they call you racist. Talk about your nation and they call you little Englanders.” (The Times, 
March 5, 2001). 
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Forth, and John Townsend, refused to sign a cross-party pledge to not stir up racial hatred in 
the election campaign, which was initiated by the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE). 
Among them, Eric Forth refused to sign the pledge on libertarian grounds, making it clear 
that he will not allow his freedom of speech to be impaired by any organization.  
But, John Townsend, MP for East Yorkshire, told the CRE chairman Garbux Singh that 
he would not sign the compact because it would be hypocritical to be associated with an 
organization he wanted to abolish. He wrote, “I believe that as a result of some of your 
activities some people are more equal than others” (The Scotsman 4/27/2001).  
Townsend also accused Tony Blair of pandering to Celtic nationalism and being prepared 
to abandon English history by taking Britain into a federal Europe. “The English feel their 
interests are ignored by a government dominated by Scots. I think Mr. Blair has no love for 
or belief in the English nation or its history. He accepts Celtic nationalism but he sees 
English patriotism as a threat to his dream of a United States of Europe” (The Scotsman 
4/27/2001). 
Later, Christopher Gill, a Conservative MP for Ludlow backed Townsend’s remark, 
comparing asylum seekers to ‘rats in a bucket’. Sir Richard Body, the Conservative MP for 
Boston and Skegness, fuelled the controversy over this turbulence with the launch of his 
book, England for the English, in which he argued that ethnic minorities would never feel 
committed to this country until they were taught about England’s history and core values 
(The Times 4/20/2001).  
In many cases, however, those who respected English traditions remained loyal to Britain. 
For example, although Enoch Powell, as a precursor of the New Right, espoused authentic 
and rooted Englishness in his ardent campaign of anti-immigration in the 1960s, he remained 
a committed British unionist. But, extreme English nationalists claim that England does not 
need to sacrifice its identity continuously for the sake of Britain. They argue that England 
must return home from Britishness to find a nation (Heffer 1999).  
The finest view of English nationalist would be that of Roger Scruton. In his book, 
England: an Elegy, Scruton (2000) says, at a time when Scottish, Welsh, and Irish 
nationalism are flourishing and English nationalism disapproved, when the customs and the 
institutions of the English are being dismantled either from outside by the EU or from inside 
by the political elite, it is time to ask what England should do. 
In Scruton’s view, the dominant social mood now says that, if one wants to mourn the 
death of English tradition, one may mourn, but privately. English stoicism, decorum, honesty, 
gentleness, and its sexual puritanism are disappearing. For Scruton (2000: 243), this is 
operated by “anonymous bureaucrats who are not us, but them.”  
Scruton also criticizes New Labour’s European policy as the transfer of sovereignty to 
the EU. With this extraordinary movement, not only has endless legislation effectively 
marginalized the common law tradition, but also English courts are required to apply 
European directives. Scruton deplores that the English are now ruled not by judgments but 
by decrees. Their law is no longer their own, thus they are no longer a sovereign people
 
(Scruton 2000: 247-52).   
As such, English nationalists prefer neither a multinational tradition of Britain nor a 
multiethnic legacy of the British Empire. They also object to any positive stance toward 
European integration. Instead, they want to preserve the Englishness of the white majority in 
a relatively isolated form. 
 
 





7. ETHNIC MINORITIES AND MULTICULTURALISM 
 
How then can devolution and European integration be defined from the viewpoint of 
ethnic minorities? Judging from the state of distribution of ethnic minorities, one might say 
that there is no direct relationship between devolution and ethnic minority. According to the 
2001 census, of the 4.6 million ethnic minorities in Britain, 96 percent (4.4 million) live in 
England, only 2.1 percent (96,000) reside in Scotland, and 1.2 percent (55,000) in Wales. 
However, if one focuses on the level of national identity that ethnic minorities would choose 
to join, the future development of devolution and the discourses surrounding it certainly 
bring an important implication for the cultural survival of ethnic minorities. 
We can examine the differences between multiculturalists and British nationalists in 
interpreting Britishness from the controversy surrounding the Parekh Report, The Future of 
Multiethnic Britain. The Commission on the Future of Multiethnic Britain, chaired by Lord 
Bhikhu Parekh, was established by the Runnymede Trust, a famous race relations think-tank 
in the UK. It began the project in January 1998 after being launched by Jack Straw, the then 
Home Secretary, and published its final report in October 2000.  
The Report argues for the urgent need of re-imagining Britain as a multicultural nation, 
and suggests several policy recommendations, such as the abolition of asylum vouchers, full 
appeal rights against deportation, an establishment of a human rights commission, and 
government’s official declaration of Britain as a multicultural society (Parekh 2000b: 56).   
Immediate and severe controversy came from two chapters of the report; chapter 2, 
‘Rethinking the National Story’ and chapter 3, ‘Identities in Transition.’ In those chapters the 
Report asserts that, for ethnic minorities, Britishness is a reminder of colonization and has 
systematic, largely unspoken, racial connotations. “Whiteness is nowhere featured as an 
explicit condition of being British, but it is widely understood that Britishness is racially 
coded. Race is deeply entwined with political culture and with the idea of nation, and 
underpinned by a distinctively British kind of reticence” (Parekh 2000b: 38-9). Therefore, 
the Report claims that, unless the deep rooted antagonism to racial and cultural difference 
can be defeated in practice, the idea of a multicultural post-nation remains an empty promise.  
A surprising blow to British nationalists in this Report was that it uses the term ‘a 
community of communities’ as a possible way of describing Britain as a whole. After The 
Daily Telegraph, a conservative newspaper, reported that the commission seems to peddle 
the anti-British agenda, the Committee was inundated by abusive and racist messages (The 
Times 10/17/2000). People assumed that the report had labeled the word Britishness as being 
racist. Many media also reported that the document suggested that the term British had racial 
connotations and was no longer appropriate in a multicultural society.  
Jack Straw, Labour Home Secretary, withdrew his welcome of the Report and declared 
“unlike the Runnymede Trust, I firmly believe that there is a future for Britain and a future 
for Britishness. I am proud to be British and of what I believe to be the best of British 
values.” He accused the Commission of ignoring what Britain had achieved in race relations, 
claiming “Indeed, last year I spoke publicly about how the concept of Britishness has 
become an inclusive plural one with people happily defining themselves as black British, or 
Chinese British” (The Times 10/12/2002; The Daily Telegraph 10/12/2002).  
Anatole Kaletsky, a columnist of The Times, attacked that the Commission was so self-
indulgent and insensitive as to compose the ludicrous passage on the systematic racial 
connotations of the word Britishness. He says, “They have forgotten Britain’s remarkable 
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records of openness in absorbing minorities” (Kaletsky 2000). Gautam Sen, in a letter to 
editor of The Times, criticized the Commission’s desire for Stalinist-style social engineering 
to correct every historical text that contains earlier prejudices as absurd (The Times 
10/12/2000). George Stern, also in a letter to editor of The Times, asked “How can you be 
patriotic about a country with no name?” (The Times 10/20/2000). Boris Johnson, editor of 
The Spectator, asserted that “They want to fragment and balkanize our country, to 
produce ...... segregated minorities whom they can represent at the taxpayers’ expense” 
(Johnson 2000). In an article on the same day, The Daily Telegraph insisted that 
Conservatives should expose the Government’s collusion in this attempt to destroy a 
thousand years of British history.  
Amid heavy attacks from the media, Parekh was forced to the defensive. He explained 
that the report was not an attack on Britain or British history. “We do not denigrate British 
history and ask instead for a just and balanced view. Too many members of the ethnic 
minority community were seen at best as welcome tenants in the UK rather than common 
owners of the country” (The Times 10/12/2000). Several days later, Parekh mentioned again 
an official opinion of the Commission in his letter to editor of The Times.
11
 Although Parekh 
regretted that the section was not made more explicit about what they were and were not 
saying, he believed “two and a half pages out of 416 have been latched onto and used to 
preempt debate and close minds” (Jaggi 2000).  
The most favorable opinion in the letters to The Times, The Guardian, and The Daily 
Telegraph during the controversial two weeks, was at most David Coleman’s. He denies 
most of fundamental beliefs of the Commission to say one positive thing. “Despite the 
Runnymede Trust report’s many ill-advised proposals and the misguided assumptions, its 
recommendation that Britain should be declared officially multicultural may be helpful” (The 
Times 10/20/2000).  
This controversy shows that Britain and Britishness can still mobilize people’s powerful 
emotive supports, thus seems not easily to disappear in the near future, especially when it 
faces some otherness like immigrants and ethnic minorities. In fact, Britain and Britishness 
among five kinds of regional nationalism can be assessed more positively from the viewpoint 
of ethnic minorities. Compared to a republican connotation of the term ‘Britain’ in the 1940s, 
in which ethnic minorities could be British subjects regardless of color and race, Scottish and 
Welsh separatists and English nationalists seek more exclusive identity based on narrowly 
defined cultural and ethnic origin.  
Therefore, one can say that devolution and the break-up of Britain could bring a 
disadvantageous situation for ethnic minorities because they hardly become ethnically 
defined English, Scottish, or Welsh. They are more comfortable saying, “I am British.” For 
example, a General Household Survey in 2001 showed that 57 percent of ethnic minorities 
chose their identity as British, while only 11 percent chose their identity as one of English, 
Scottish, Welsh, and Irish. This rate suggests significant difference from those of white 
British, in which only 44 percent chose their identity as British, while 54 percent chose their 
                                                          
11 Parekh wrote “All we suggest is that, given the devolution of power to Scotland and Wales and 
eventually to English regions, Britain’s nationhood is best secured by seeing itself as a community of 
communities. We say racial not racist. For centuries the British population was overwhelmingly white, 
and hence it is perfectly natural that Britishness connotes whiteness. Things are now changing. We 
warmly welcome the increasing deracialization of the new Britishness which allows blacks, Asians, 
and others to accept it with enthusiasm.” The Times, October 17, 2000. 




identity as one of English, Scottish, Welsh, and Irish (The Office for National Statistics 
2002). 
From the viewpoint of negative effects of ethnic nationalism, Harry Goulbourne 
appraises that Britain developed a civic culture that respects individual freedom, the rule of 
law, and tolerance of difference. But Scottish and Welsh separatism and English nationalism 
are inclined to deny this tradition. So, Goulborne worries about the rise of ethno-cultural 
paradigm that vacates common civic space of Britishness and retreat into exclusivity of 
ethnic nation (Goulbourne 1991). 
Yasmin Alibhai-Brown is also surprised with cultural arrogance of Scottish Nationalist 
Party, which argues assimilation into superior culture rather than equality and diversity 
among different cultures. According to Alibhai-Brown, many black and Asian Britons in 
Scotland and Wales feel excluded by the new political elite who have championed ethnic 
oriented nationalism. They fear that the more capacious British identity that once embraced 
them will be discarded, leaving them as outsiders in their own land. Therefore, she supports 
Britishness as a civic device to bind people together without recourse to ethnicity (Alibhai-
Brown 2000a; 2000b: 26-7).  
If one follows these positions, Britain and Britishness can be said to have wider space to 
accommodate various identities of ethnic minorities than other positions. New Labour’s 
devolved Britain would have enough capacity to adjust its practice to idealized visions of 
multicultural needs. In the sense that Conservative British nationalists pursue sovereign 
individual under the civic Britishness, they also deserve more positive evaluation in 
protecting the rights of ethnic minorities than other kinds of regional nationalism. 
 
 
8. BRINGING BRITISHNESS BACK IN 
 
Between two competing views on the destiny of Britishness, New Labour as the ruling 
party since 1997 positively assesses the core values of Britishness and their contribution to 
the development of democracy. They think that Britishness has enough room that can be 
shared among national and ethnic minorities. Therefore, they try to deal with the challenges 
of devolution, European integration, and multiculturalism through reshaping Britain as a 
multilevel governance entity. As the institutional arrangements necessary to hold together 
four sub-nations, New Labour has established the quasi-federal or asymmetrical devolution. 
The main characteristics of New Labour’s policy to maintain a tolerant one nation with an 
intergovernmental network of Europe can be summarized as follows.  
First, New Labour wants to build up one Britain based on the positive recognition of each 
sub-nation — England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. This position differs from 
English nationalists who support a symmetrical devolution. English nationalists argue no 
more Britain, considering Scotland and Wales as a subsidy-draining periphery. New 
Labour’s position also differs from the view of Conservative British nationalists who do not 
support devolution. Conservative British nationalists argue that devolution means to deny 
parliamentary sovereignty as a core value of Britishness. They also insist that devolution 
gives power to anti-parliament group, which brings the destruction of unity and identity of 
Britain.   
Second, New Labour gives political consideration to the legacy of the British Empire and 
Commonwealth, and recognizes the role of the EU as an inter-governmental network, if not a 
federal super-government. In contrast, arguing for British exceptionalism and favoring 
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isolation, Conservative British nationalists no longer accept strong commitment to the British 
Empire. They also oppose the trend of integration with the EU. On the other hand, Scottish 
and Welsh nationalists see the downfall of Britain as desirable to get their full self-
government in the mainstream of Europe.  
Third, New Labour acknowledges the constitutive character of national identity. It thus 
believes that social cohesion cannot be guaranteed by the top-down action of the state or by 
appeal to a traditional authority structure. It rejects conservative nationalism which holds that 
the unitary nation must reign supreme and that one nation inherited from the past must be 
protected from cultural contamination. At the same time, it also rejects the radical 
multiculturalism of the libertarians who want to embrace cultural pluralism at whatever cost, 
seeing national identity as artificially structured or as serving the interest of the ruling groups 
(Giddens 1998: 132). Emphasizing solidarity in one-nation, New Labour argues that a 
traditional British national identity can be compatible with ethnic and cultural pluralism 
(Blair 1996: 296; Giddens 1998: 37).   
However, identity is not about pride alone, it is also about interest (Aughey 2001: 54). 
Pragmatically, devolution for New Labour means to remove a possible ground of extreme 
separatists to avoid a situation of the break-up of Britain. Britain still has attraction to four 
sub-nations, especially to England, in claiming their shares in the world order. For example, 
an independent state of England would not retain the seat as a permanent member of the 
Security Council of the United Nations, which the United Kingdom currently possesses. 
Moreover, considering violent protests of minority nationalities within multinational states, 
asymmetrical devolution is a small price to pay for avoiding such conflicts (Brown 1998: 
215-23).  
New Labour’s relatively active participation in European integration process is also an 
inevitable choice so as not to lose its interest and voice over economic relationship with 
Europe, which occupies over 60 percent of the national trade. New Labour, therefore, 
redefines sovereignty, not merely as the ability of a single country to say no, but as the power 
to maximize national capacity in trade, foreign policy, and defense. It argues that sovereignty 
has to be deployed for national advantage, not through isolation from, but through 
participation in Europe.  
A successful inclusion of ethnic minorities is related to peace for Britain. As was seen in 
the 2001 race riots that swept northern England cities such as Olhdam, Burnley, Bradford, 
and Leed, it has been an urgent task for New Labour to deal with minorities’ desire for 
cultural survival as well as agony of economic deprivation. In efforts for the inclusion of 
ethnic minorities into a political community, Britain and Britishness becomes a good house 
to accommodate various identities of minorities as well as majorities. In this sense, New 
Labour argues the constitutive character of national identity that is compatible with ethnic 
and cultural pluralism. 
As far as this combination of pride and interest of the related parties goes together, 
Britain and Britishness will not easily disappear in the near future. However, there would be 
some difficulties in each area of challenges. For example, while devolution certainly 
decentralized the power of Westminster, it also made other new centers. The Scottish 
parliament and Welsh assembly as emerging centers have brought erosion of autonomy that 
local councils previously enjoyed (Bonney 2002: 135-43). Around three-quarters of English 
councils believe that their powers will be stripped away to eight regional assemblies that 
New Labour promises to create through a referendum, likely before 2007 (The Guardian 
5/29/2003). This phenomenon indicates that multi-level governance does not guarantee 




sharing equal power according to the levels. In democratic case for devolution, local councils 
seem to be skeptical about the idea that devolution brings government closer to the people.  
Each region as an autonomous polity also needs to have a collective identity or a high 
degree of trust among citizens, which is enough to accept sacrifice imposed in the name of 
majority, since the self-governing parliament ruling assumes such duty of all citizens (Weiler 
1999; Kay 2003). If there is no collective identity or underlying belief in their essential 
sameness, it causes the concern for a democratic deficit. In this case, devolution as a way of 
maintaining Britain has no substantive meaning. It is just devolution for the sake of 
devolution, which lacks the voluntary agreement among people as citizens of an autonomous 
polity. Especially in Wales, an elected Assembly came first and it has then aimed to foster a 
collective identity of the Welsh people. This is typically a reversed process following the 
convenient statist short-cut. From the viewpoint of democratic consensus formation, a 
collective identity of citizens is supposed to come first and then a parliament should be 
assembled based on such will and trust of citizens. 
Multicultural policy would also cause a problem when it aims exclusively for 
assimilation of minorities. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, David Blunkett, 
Home Secretary, declared a new framework for keeping British core values, which would set 
limits to the cultural pluralism of the past. He announced the introduction of an oath of 
allegiance for immigrants, an English language test, and tougher border control. He even 
denounced an arranged marriage style in South Asian communities (The Daily Telegraph 
12/12/2001). New Labour’s recent turn was criticized as the return of assimilation policy of 
the 1960s (Back et al. 2002). Accordingly, for ethnic minorities, the racial connotation of 
Britishness seems to be more emphasized and the idea of a multicultural post-nation seems to 
remain an empty promise. In this development, ‘a community of communities’ would gain 
support among minorities as a possible way of describing Britain as a whole.  
In the policies regarding Europe, there will be referendums for a single currency 
membership and the proposed EU constitution, which are likely to be held in the near future. 
It could bring critical conflicts within England, and among the four nations as well, 
according to the differences in the approval rates. If a referendum favors opting out of the 
euro membership due to the low approval rate in England, despite the high approval rate in 
Scotland and Wales, the future of devolution can be a way to the break-up of Britain. To 
secure enough time to obtain a wider consensus on this agenda, Gordon Brown, Labour 
Chancellor, has suggested five tests by which Britain can evaluate the gains and the losses of 
euro membership (The Guardian 9/29/2000).
12
 
However, despite these five test questions, the problem is that no one can agree on how to 
measure better conditions or positive effects. As Gus O’Donnell, director of the Treasury 
team, said, “economics can never be clear and unambiguous” (The Times 1/10/2002). 
Therefore, to handle further integration into the EU, and to manage its related influence on 
devolution and multicultural matters, ultimately will be a political decision. This means that 
New Labour’s desire to maintain Britain as a form of the multilevel governance will face 
                                                          
12 Here are the five tests. One, would joining the economic and monetary union (EMU) create better 
conditions for firms making long-term decisions to invest in the United Kingdom? Two, how would 
adopting the single currency affect our financial services? Three, are business cycles and economic 
structures compatible so that we and others in Europe could live comfortably with euro interest rates 
on a permanent basis? Four, if problems emerge, is there sufficient flexibility to deal with them? Five, 
will joining EMU help to promote higher growth, stability and a lasting increase in jobs? 
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another phase of challenges. It should find the way to mitigate the regional difference of 
people’s anti-Europe sentiment and its interest in maintaining influence on the future of 
European development.  
If New Labour succeeds in overcoming these difficulties in each area of challenges, thus 
properly concerts to bring each group’s pride as well as their interests together, the future of 
Britain will be close to an ethical institution that has a collective identity based on common 
citizenship rather than a mere administrative structure that is bloodless and affectless. People 
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